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Although aggressive behavior is socially highly undesirable, it is prevalent in 
contemporary societies as well as human history and media portrayals of human interactions. 
The insight that lashing out aggressively does not only have severe negative consequences for 
the target of this behavior but also for the actor likely leads to the valid conclusion that such 
behavior is often executed against the actor’s own self-interest. Searching for an explanation for 
this puzzling fact has led several scholars to assume a typical self-control conflict between 
impulsive aggression and an inner antagonist whose job it is to stifle these aggressive impulses 
(e.g., DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007). In this view, impulses are aggressive and 
need to be controlled by rational and non-aggressive instances reinforcing socially acceptable 
behavior. In the present chapter we aim to argue that the Reflective-Impulsive Model (RIM) by 
Fritz Strack and Roland Deutsch (2004) is helpful in overcoming this simplified and mechanistic 
model by incorporating the idea of individual differences on automatic and controlled levels of 
information processing that will determine how which individual will behave under which 
circumstances. 
The RIM is an attempt to provide a comprehensive explanatory framework for the 
prediction of social behavior. Although this work is building on a history of dual-system theories 
comprising Freud’s psychodynamic account (e.g., 1915/1960), Shiffrin and Schneider’s (1977) 
distinction between automatic and controlled information processing, Epstein’s (1994) theory of 
personality, Sloman’s (1996) theory of reasoning, as well as Smith & DeCoster’s (2000) dual-
process model, Strack and Deutsch’s endeavor to integrate more than a hundred years of theory 
and empirical research into a unified model of social behavior is ambitious, if not daring. The 
RIM has encountered a lot of praise, and, as to be expected for a theory making strong claims, 
also a lot of criticism (e.g., Keren & Schul, 2009). In the following we will investigate to what 
extent the RIM has already contributed or could contribute to a better understanding of 
aggressive behavior and compare it with another prominent model of aggression. 
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At about the same time when the RIM was published, Anderson and Bushman (2002) 
proposed a General Aggression Model (GAM) with the intention to integrate a number of 
domain-specific aggression theories into one comprehensive framework. In a similar vein as the 
RIM, the GAM tries to integrate cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes to explain the 
occurrence of aggressive behavior. Both models are similar in many ways; in particular they 
both emphasize knowledge structures and cognitive processes as major determinants of 
(aggressive) behavior. Whereas the GAM is formulated in the tradition of appraisal theories of 
stress and emotion (e.g., Lazarus, 1991), the RIM stands in the more recent tradition of social 
cognition research that is based on generalized dual-process models distinguishing between 
associative and rule-based information processing (Payne & Gawronski, 2010). Besides these 
more superficial aspects of form, the critical questions are whether different predictions can be 
derived from both models, and whether they differ in their explanatory power. 
Explaining Aggression as a Special Case of Social Behavior: Reflective-Impulsive 
Model vs. General Aggression Model  
Drawing on Cognitive Neoassociation Theory (Berkowitz, 1990) and other social 
information processing accounts of aggression (e.g., Crick & Dodge, 1994; Huesmann, 1988; 
1998), Anderson and Bushman (2002) have proposed the GAM that aims to integrate specific or 
limited “mini-theories” of aggression into a unified theory. In a nutshell, the GAM postulates 
that aggressive behavior is the result of an immediate automatic appraisal of social situations 
that elicits specific cognitions, affective reactions, and arousal levels according to the 
momentarily activated perceptual schemata, associative knowledge structures, and motivations. 
If this result of the immediate appraisal is perceived to be either satisfying or unimportant, the 
individual will implement impulsive action that may be aggressive or not depending on the 
automatically activated behavior scripts. If the result of this immediate appraisal is perceived to 
be unsatisfactory and there are sufficient resources (e.g., cognitive capacity and time), a more 
complex re-appraisal will take place that may result in the implementation of more thoughtful 
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action. Unfortunately, Anderson and Bushman (2002) do not explain which kind of homunculus 
decides whether the outcome of a primary appraisal is satisfactory or not.  
The information processing account of the GAM integrates the mainly situation-focused 
perspective of social psychology and the mainly person-focused perspective of personality 
psychology. For example, situational cues known to elicit aggression (such as weapons or 
provocations) can be accounted for by considering them as primes that activate cognitive 
schemas related to anger, arousal, hostile thoughts, and eventually aggressive behavior in the 
associative network of the knowledge structure. The individual difference perspective can be 
accounted for by postulating that repeated exposure to violent situations (e.g., parental abuse, or 
media violence) as well as repeated practice of violent behavior (e.g., playing violent video 
games, involvement in fights) will result in a chronically high availability and strong 
interconnectedness of hostile thoughts, schemata, and behavior scripts, which in turn facilitate 
the activation and implementation of aggressive behavior scripts. In other words, in the GAM 
actual aggressive behavior is conceptualized as the result of a momentary activation of 
aggression-related thoughts, emotions, and behaviors; trait aggressiveness is conceptualized as 
the degree of connectedness and excitability of the very same aggression-related knowledge 
structure. In this way the GAM provides a conceptual framework that is able to integrate the 
results of 30 years of aggression research including experimental and survey findings. 
A second important feature of the model is the distinction between two different modes 
of information processing. The GAM postulates an automatic, spontaneous appraisal process 
outside of awareness leading to impulsive action, and a more effortful, deliberate appraisal 
process leading to thoughtful action. Although this distinction and terminology seems to 
originate in Lazarus’ (1991) emotion theory featuring the distinction of primary and secondary 
appraisal, this aspect of the GAM converges with more general dual-system accounts of human 
information processing that are of central importance in theories of implicit social cognition 
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such as Strack and Deutsch’s (2004) RIM (see also Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996; Smith & 
DeCoster, 2000). 
In their comprehensive model, Strack and Deutsch (2004) postulate that human behavior 
is controlled by two distinct systems of information processing which can both activate motor 
schemata as a common final pathway in the elicitation of behavior. Both systems have very 
different properties. The impulsive system relies on an associative network containing the 
implicit knowledge base of the individual. Upon a specific input by perception or imagination, 
activation spreads through the network according to the association strengths between the 
entities or nodes. This process occurs fast and automatically without allocating attention. The 
impulsive system is limited to very simple operations but is able to efficiently handle 
automatized if-then contingencies, or the regularities in the individual’s transactions with the 
environment. The reflective system relies on the same associative knowledge base, but it can 
handle much more complex computations, by integrating propositional relations between 
concepts, truth values, and syllogistic reasoning. Contrary to the impulsive system it learns 
quickly, but it depends on an active allocation of attention and cognitive resources. Motivational 
and emotional influences on behavior are accounted for by postulating that these activate 
specific relevant knowledge structures and behavior scripts. 
The general architecture of the RIM appears to be compatible with the GAM (Anderson 
& Bushman, 2002) that postulates frequently shown aggressive behaviors to result in mental 
representations of the self as aggressive, more accessible scripts of aggressive behavior, and 
more positive attitudes towards aggressive behavior. The GAM also distinguishes a more 
reflective or rational mode of information processing leading to instrumental aggressive 
behavior, and a more automatic mode leading to impulsive aggressive behavior. The differences 
between GAM and RIM appear to be mainly of terminological nature: to explain automatically 
elicited or impulsive aggression, the RIM postulates an elicitation by the impulsive mode of 
information processing that is not counteracted by reflective processing, and the GAM a primary 
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appraisal1 process that is not overridden by secondary appraisal processes. Both models have in 
common that the activation of impulsive aggression can only occur if there are cognitive 
structures (associations, scripts, or schemas) that make the individual prone to behave 
aggressively. Given that the very same behavior can be impulsive or thoughtful aggression, it is 
difficult to investigate the elicitation of impulsive aggression.  
For a long time the evidence for “impulsive” aggression research rested on studies 
showing that taxing psychological resources for effortful self-control as a proxy for secondary 
appraisal or reflective self-control increased aggressive behavior (e.g., DeWall et al., 2007). 
These studies, however, could only be interpreted as evidence for the proposed model under the 
additional assumption that on average individuals’ implicit cognitive structure makes them 
prone to behave aggressively. Only after the emergence of reliable and valid indirect measures 
such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998) there was a 
chance to investigate the underlying implicit cognitive structure that is assumed to be causally 
responsible for impulsive aggressive behavior. Although indirect measures are far from being 
process pure assessments of the impulsive self-concept, they provide a first access to the causes 
and not only the effects of automatically activated (hence impulsive) aggressive behavior 
(Nosek, Hawkins, & Frazier, 2011).  
Can Impulsive Aggressiveness Be Assessed With the Aggressiveness-IAT? 
Building on prior work (e.g., Banse & Fischer, 2002), Banse, Messer, and Fischer (2015) 
developed an Aggressiveness-IAT (Agg-IAT). Whereas an aggressiveness questionnaire taps 
into the introspectively accessible self-concept of aggressiveness, the Agg-IAT is supposed to 
assess implicit associations between the self and aggressive behavior. At the conceptual level, 
both assessment methods can be conceived of as measures of trait aggressiveness, either explicit, 
or implicit, respectively. However, at the empirical level it had to be shown that the Agg-IAT 
                                                 
1 Notably, in order to be comparable with the RIM, primary appraisal needs to be construed as an immediate and 
simple associative evaluation as otherwise it would be similar to reflective information processing based on more 
complex evaluations of relations between cognitive content.  
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could be used to close the “impulsive aggression assessment gap”. In a first step, it had to be 
demonstrated that (a) the Agg-IAT predicts aggressive behavior, (b) this prediction holds after 
controlling for direct, questionnaire-based measures of aggressiveness, and (c) the Agg-IAT 
predicts aggressive behavior under circumstances in which the impulsive system is more likely 
to control behavior than the reflective system. An empirical demonstration of (a) to (c) can be 
considered as necessary conditions for an assessment of the automatically activated self-concept 
of aggressiveness with the Agg-IAT. A sufficient condition would consist of an empirical 
demonstration that (d) the experimental manipulation of the dominance of the reflective or the 
impulsive system would lead to a superior prediction of aggressive behavior by a direct or 
indirect measure of aggressiveness, respectively. This was attempted in a study by Schmidt, 
Zimmermann, Banse, and Imhoff (2015) that is presented in a later section of this chapter. 
Predicting Aggressive Behavior with the Aggressiveness-IAT 
The Agg-IAT developed by Banse et al. (2015) is a self-concept or personality variant of 
the IAT using the labels SELF and OTHERS for the object dimension, and PEACEFUL and 
AGGRESSIVE for the attribute dimension of the IAT. Diverting from standard self-concept 
IATs the items used for the OTHER category were not pronouns (other, them, etc.) but 
occupation labels such as book-keeper, architect, educator, cook, and farmer that had been 
pretested to be perceived as people with an average level of trait aggressiveness. These labels 
had been chosen with the intention to link the OTHER category to the general population rather 
than to more specific sub-groups as, for example, the own in-group when responding to the IAT. 
For the attribute dimension, two variants were developed. An Agg-IATBehavior used behavior-
related stimulus words for the peaceful-aggressive dimension such as to talk, reconciliation, 
dialogue, compromise versus vengeance, to punch, to fight, to beat, to revenge, respectively. For 
the Agg-IATTrait variant, trait adjectives denoting an aggressive or peaceful personality were 
used (e.g., amicable, conciliatory, peaceful versus abusive, aggressive, threatening). 
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In a series of three studies (Banse et al., 2015) it was tested whether the Agg-IATs 
predicted aggressive behavior. In Study 1, penalty records over a whole season of young male 
ice-hockey players were used to generate an aggressive behavior index (for another sample of 
volleyball players no penalty index could be calculated because there were too few penalties). In 
Study 2, a female sample of psychology students completed a modified version of the Taylor 
Aggression Paradigm (TAP; Taylor, 1967) in which the loudness of sounds inflicted on an 
ostensible opponent in a competitive game was used as a behavioral measure of aggressiveness. 
Finally, Study 3 used an observer aggressiveness rating of friends and acquaintances of male 
students as a proxy of everyday observable aggressive behavior in social situations. Although 
the Agg-IATTrait predicted aggressive behavior in female psychology students in Study 2, it did 
not in ice-hockey players in Study 1. The results of the Agg-IATBehavior were slightly more 
consistent across studies.2 For this reason the trait-variant of the IAT was dropped in Study 3. 
Across Studies 1 to 3, the Agg-IATBehavior correlated significantly and substantially with the 
aggressive behavior indices (rs = .37, .38, and .42, respectively). Moreover, when the Agg-
IATBehavior was entered into a regression analysis after a standard questionnaire measure of 
aggressiveness in Studies 1 to 3, it accounted for an additional proportion of 15%, 11%, and 
13% of the respective aggressive behavior indices. 
In summary, the empirical tests confirmed the hypotheses that the Agg-IATBehavior not 
only was consistently correlated with aggressive behavior, but in addition incrementally 
predicted (retrodicted in Study 1) three different types of aggressive behavior above and beyond 
                                                 
2 The Agg-IATTrait consists of trait adjectives such as aggressive, peaceful and synonyms. The Agg-IATBehavior 
features nouns and verbs denoting aggressive versus peaceful behavior (e.g., hitting – discussing). The behavior-
based approach may be advantageous because an aggressive individual may have developed a strong association 
between the concepts ME and hitting, threatening, etc. without qualifying the own behavior as aggressive. A self-
concept containing the trait word “aggressive” requires some degree of critical self-reflection or social feedback, 
whereas an association between the self and aggressive behaviors does only require co-activation of both concepts, 
not critical reflection. It may therefore be that both IATs work with individuals engaging in critical self-reflection 
(e.g., psychology students), but the Agg-IATBehavior may be more suitable for individuals that are more action-
oriented (e.g., young ice hockey players). However, this speculation warrants systematic empirical testing.  
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an explicit measure of aggressiveness.3 An independent study (Grumm, Hein, & Fingerle, 2011) 
obtained similar results with children aged 9 to 11 years, applying an idiographic variant of the 
Aggressiveness-IAT that used personalized items (own first name, own family name, own 
gender etc.) as stimuli for the self-other dimension and only verbs as stimuli for the aggressive-
peaceful dimension. They also used a variant of the TAP that was particularly suitable for 
children. The Agg-IAT and an explicit measure of aggressiveness independently predicted 
aggressive behavior, the IAT accounted for 5% of the variance. 
Overall the evidence is compatible with the notion that Agg-IATs using behavior-based 
stimuli tap into the associative knowledge structure of the impulsive system as postulated by the 
RIM. As mentioned above, an incremental prediction of aggressive behavior above and beyond 
self-reported aggressiveness is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition to show the validity of 
the RIM’s prediction regarding impulsive aggression. 
Social Desirability as a Moderator of the Relationship between the Aggressiveness-IAT 
and Aggressive Behavior 
In the literature on implicit prejudice there is a standard moderator effect (Fazio, 
Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Steward, 2005) that confirms 
the validity of indirect measures of prejudice (Evaluative Priming, IAT, Affective Misattribution 
Procedure), and that the IAT taps into a more automatic process of information processing than 
a racism questionnaire that taps into a more controlled mode. In participants with a low 
motivation to control prejudiced reactions (MCPR, Fazio et al., 1995), there is a positive 
correlation between the implicit and explicit measure of prejudice. In participants with a high 
motivation to control prejudiced reactions, however, this relation is zero or even reverses to 
negative values. 
                                                 
3 The Agg-IATTrait did not correlate with the penalty index for ice-hockey players in Study 1, and accounted for 9% 
of the variance of aggressive behavior assessed with the TAP in Study 2. 
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In an analogous way we had predicted that the relation between the Agg-IAT and 
aggressive behavior is moderated by the impression-management facet of social desirability 
(SD). In terms of the RIM one would expect SD low-scorers to make little effort to control 
impulsive aggressive tendencies. In consequence, the amount of overt aggressive behavior 
should covary with the automatic activation of an aggressive self-concept. SD high-scorers, 
however, should be inclined to show very little socially sanctioned aggression, no matter how 
strong their aggressive impulses are. They may even over-control strong impulsive aggressive 
tendencies, rendering implicitly highly aggressive individuals particularly peaceful at the 
behavioral level. In consequence, in SD low-scorers the relation between the Agg-IAT and 
aggressive behavior should be positive, but zero or negative in SD high-scorers.  
The postulated moderator effect of SD was analyzed using the data of the three behavior 
prediction studies reported in Banse et al. (2015). In Study 1, a coach judgment of 
aggressiveness was assessed for ice-hockey players and volleyball players and used as a proxy 
of observable aggressive behavior. The time penalty index of aggressive behavior (available 
only for ice-hockey players) was used as a behavioral index of aggressiveness. The two 
aggressiveness indicators were regressed on SD, the Agg-IAT score (both IAT-variants in 
separate analyses), as well as the SD x Agg-IAT cross-product terms. A significant Social 
desirability x IATBehavior effect (β = -.38, p = .002), accounting for 11% of the variance, was 
found for the coach judgment of aggressiveness for both ice-hockey players and volleyball 
players (Figure 1). No moderation effect was found for the penalty index. The same series of 
moderated regression analyses was conducted with the Agg-IATTrait. No moderation effects 
emerged. 
In Study 2, the two moderated regression analyses were conducted by regressing the 
volume scores of the TAP on the Agg-IAT, SD, and their cross product term for both Agg-IAT 
variants. The resulting regression slopes were similar for both IAT variants, but this time only 
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the interaction term for the IATTrait yielded a significant beta weight of -.34 (p = .024), and 
accounted for a significant 7% of the variability in aggressive behavior. 
To further explore the relation between SD and aggressive behavior in the TAP, we 
investigated whether SD was related to the contingency between the loudness of sounds received 
by the alleged opponent and the loudness of sounds inflicted upon the opponent. For each 
individual an indicator of a tit-for-tat strategy was computed as the correlation between received 
volume level and chosen volume level in response. A positive correlation between such a tit-for-
tat strategy and SD (r = .29, p < .05), suggested that SD high-scorers tended to mirror the 
behavior of the alleged opponent by changing the volume in accordance with the opponent’s last 
move, whereas SD low-scorers behaved as if they were guided by their own level of automatic 
aggressiveness for choosing the volume inflicted on the opponent. Hence, SD moderated the 
relation between the indirect measure of aggressiveness and overt aggressive behavior.  
The results on the SD moderation effect are inconsistent and far from conclusive. 
However, three out of ten significant results and one near miss (similar interaction configuration 
that did not reach statistical significance), and all significant effects in independent samples, are 
quite a lot if the null-hypothesis were true; by chance one would expect only one significant 
result in 20. We therefore maintain that these results are at least suggestive and should be 
followed on in future research. From the perspective of the RIM, a high SD-score may be 
conceived of as a strong motivation to deliberately control impulsive action if the impulse is 
socially undesirable. This is almost always the case with regard to impulsive aggression (except 
perhaps in ice hockey players in a match). Future studies should aim for more statistical power 
and they should systematically vary behavior indicators and the situational setting of aggression. 
For example, it may be that rule violations in ice-hockey leading to penalties are almost always 
impulsive, and leave no room for moderation effects of SD. In the theoretical framework of the 
RIM the SD moderation effect lends at least indirect support that impulsive aggressiveness has 
trait character and can be assessed with the Agg-IAT. 
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Even stronger support for the dual nature of the behavior determination system would 
require a double dissociation that has already been demonstrated in other psychology domains 
(e.g., shyness, see Asendorpf, Banse, & Mücke, 2002). The same behavior should result from 
impulsive information processing under conditions of limited motivation or ability to execute 
reflective control, and should result from reflective information processing under conditions in 
which individuals are willing and able to override their impulsive system. Such a perspective 
combines basic assumptions of the RIM with an individual difference perspective on both 
systems and a classical social psychological perspective on situational constraints. 
Moderation of the Association of Direct and Indirect Measures with Aggressive Behavior 
To recap, whether aggressive behavior is executed in a certain situation (e.g., after 
provocation) depends on the strength of activation that has been triggered by either the reflective 
or the impulsive system for each behavioral option (i.e., to act out or stifle aggression). In case 
of a synergistic activation of the same behavioral options via both information processing 
systems behavior prediction is a straightforward task. However, in the case of antagonistic 
activation when one system inhibits whereas the other disinhibits aggression prediction is more 
demanding: Behavior execution will depend not only on individual differences in the two 
information processing systems but also on their interaction with situational boundary conditions 
that strengthen either reflective or impulsive precursors of aggression. As outlined in the 
introductory section of this chapter, demands on cognitive resources are a crucial characteristic 
of the RIM. Whereas the reflective system is driven by slow, deliberative, and effortful 
processes (i.e., requiring many cognitive resources), the impulsive system operates fast, 
automatically, and effortlessly (i.e., requiring few cognitive resources). Hence, the domination 
of one system over the other can largely be framed as a function of available self-regulatory 
resources (Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009; Perugini, Richetin, & Zogmaister, 2010; and with a 
specific focus on aggression Richetin & Richardson, 2008).  
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Over the last decade, a particularly fruitful line of research has focused on the amount of 
self-control efforts that are maintained in a certain situation (DeWall et al., 2007; Stucke & 
Baumeister, 2006; Vohs, Glass, Maddox, & Markman, 2011) or dispositionally (Hofmann, 
Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers, & Schmitt, 2008) as a boundary condition impacting on 
aggression. Particularly, ego depletion tasks (ED; Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007) that decrease 
self-regulatory efforts after initial exertion of self-control have been used to experimentally 
manipulate acute self-regulatory load. Across several studies it has consistently been shown that 
ED increases aggression (DeWall et al., 2007; Stucke & Baumeister, 2006; Vohs et al., 2011). 
From a RIM perspective, such a pattern is consistent with the idea that the impulsive system is 
likely to instigate aggression but is typically controlled by a reflective system aiming to comply 
with social and internal norms of non-violence. To a degree, this notion is compatible with a 
Freudian interpretation of an (impulsive) id that is inherently aggressive and has to be kept in its 
limits by the (reflective) ego that negotiates behavior in accordance with reality and 
(internalized) social norms (super-ego). Importantly, the RIM prediction goes beyond that by 
allowing an individual difference perspective if we accept the above mentioned Agg-IAT as a 
valid method to assess the automatically activated aggressiveness self-concept. Although it may 
very well be the case that the impulsive precursors are on average more aggressive than 
reflective consideration, a taxation of resources (e.g., via ED) should increase (or decrease) 
aggressive behavior to the extent that the impulsive system instigates (or inhibits) aggressive 
behavior tendencies. 
In the first study to test this idea directly (Schmidt et al., 2015), we hypothesized a 
specific double dissociation pattern (Asendorpf et al., 2002; Perugini et al., 2010) that so far has 
been experimentally demonstrated only for food and alcohol consumption (Friese, Hoffmann, & 
Wänke, 2008). We supposed that the automatically activated aggressiveness self-concept would 
elicit reactive aggressive behavior only in highly ego-depleted individuals as opposed to 
aggressive precursors from the reflective system being linked to reactive aggressive behavior 
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only in the low-ED condition. To this end, we assessed explicit (self-report questionnaire) and 
implicit (Agg-IATBehavior) individual differences in the aggressiveness self-concept and 
experimentally manipulated ED levels. The same TAP from the studies described above has 
been used to measure behavioral reactive aggression. We conducted a moderated regression 
analysis regressing TAP mean volume levels after provocation on (a) the effect-coded ED 
manipulation (-1 for low ED, +1 for high ED), (b) z-standardized self-reported aggressiveness 
and Agg-IAT levels, as well as (c) all resulting interaction terms from these three predictors. As 
the three-way interaction was not significant, we could demonstrate two independent two-way 
interactions (alongside main effects for all predictors) corroborating the hypothesized double 
dissociation (Figure 3). Specifically, simple slope analyses revealed that the Agg-IAT was 
linked to reactive aggression in highly ego-depleted individuals (b = .91, p < .01) but not in the 
low-ED condition (b = -.06, p > .60). Conversely, self-reported aggressiveness was associated 
with TAP aggression in the lesser depleted participants (b = .65, p < .05) but not in the high-ED 
condition (b = -.05, p > .80) (Schmidt et al., 2015).  
The reported double dissociation pattern underscores the surplus of explanatory power of 
the RIM for the prediction of aggressive behavior over and above acute self-regulatory 
impairments: Under conditions of low self-regulatory capacity not every provoked individual 
will lash out aggressively. Aggressive behavior is indeed dependent on the interplay of 
individual differences in aggressiveness on automatic and controlled levels as predicted by a 
dual-systems perspective. Although this model is rather complex, it poses nevertheless an 
elegant and powerful framework for the explanation of behavioral phenomena (as mirrored in 
the significant increase from 22% to 37% of explained variance; Schmidt et al., 2015). At the 
same time, the RIM might shed light on a vexing conundrum in psychology – the debate about 
how to construe the “true self” (Gawronski, 2009). One might have good reasons to extrapolate 
the true self from automatic behavior that is shown in situations of impaired self-control (e.g., 
drunkenness reveals the true persona). However, it is equally reasonable to base such a judgment 
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on the person’s deliberate behavior in situations where self-regulatory resources are intact (e.g., 
engaging in effortful protest against certain political decisions). From the perspective of the 
RIM, both versions of the self are equally authentic, but differently valid under distinct 
boundary conditions. This also explains the differential predictive validities associated with 
direct and indirect measures tapping into reflective and impulsive behavioral precursors 
(Perugini et al., 2010). 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
The evidence reported in this chapter is overall consistent and points to the usefulness of 
applying the RIM to one of modern societies’ most pressing problems: aggressiveness. At the 
same time, however, the available evidence is far from conclusive. Particularly the gold standard 
for a dual-process assumption, the double dissociation, has up to now only been empirically 
demonstrated in a single study (Schmidt et al., 2015) that does not meet the current standards of 
statistical power (i.e., sample size). This important first demonstration, thus, calls for systematic 
replications with sufficient statistical power. Robust and replicable double dissociations in 
predicting aggressive behavior would constitute an important example for the applicability of 
the RIM to aggressive behavior. 
Although the presented results are compatible with the RIM, they beg the – admittedly 
blasphemous – question whether such a complex model is needed in order to predict the 
observed data pattern or whether there are theoretically more parsimonious explanations. 
Reassuringly, there are none (although there is a lively debate whether dual-process models 
outperform single-process explanations, e.g., Keren & Schul, 2009). Thinking about aggressive 
behavior in the RIM framework could suggest that there are more controlled forms of aggression 
(enervated by the reflective system) and more impulsive forms of aggression (enervated by the 
impulsive system). This seems to be well aligned with the notion that aggression can be either 
instrumental (with the goal of harming an individual as only a proximate goal in order to achieve 
a higher-order non-aggressive goal) or hostile (with the goal of harming an individual as an end 
AGGRESSION AND THE REFLECTIVE-IMPULSIVE MODEL  16 
goal). However, this dichotomy of aggressive behavior has come under harsh attack, calling for 
a knowledge structure approach to aggression that does not confound behavioral dichotomies 
with processing dichotomies and also allows for multi-causal behavior determination (Bushman 
& Anderson, 2001). Applying this criticism to a RIM-inspired understanding of aggression 
would imply that aggressive behavior may be elicited to differing degrees by both reflective and 
impulsive information processing, depending on the underlying cognitive structure, motivational 
states, and situational influence. As an example, slapping someone’s face is likely to be the 
result of impulsive system processing when cognitive resources are low and social desirability 
concerns do not play a major role (e.g., in a bar fight late at night), but likely to be determined 
by more controlled processing and propositional reasoning when both these factors are high 
(e.g., as a reaction to an insult in a formal setting to prevent face-loss). 
Although simple moderation effects in which individuals behave more aggressively after 
ED or when they have low SD concerns are in principle compatible with a more simplistic 
dichotomy of aggressive impulses and rational, non-aggressive internalized norms, the double 
dissociation clearly requires an explanation that integrates the assumptions of substantial inter-
individual variation at both of these levels. Individuals whose automatic associations do not 
prompt aggressive behavioral tendencies after provocation will not lash out even after the most 
strenuous depletion, whereas individuals whose propositional knowledge suggests aggression as 
a preferable behavioral strategy will be aggressive even in the absence of any disinhibiting 
factors and may indeed behave more peacefully after ED (if their implicit self-concept of 
aggressiveness suggests so).  
The RIM represents an overarching model of information processing that allows 
meaningful predictions regarding aggressive behavior. For the case of aggression, however, very 
similar predictions could be made on the base of the more specific GAM. Aside from all 
conceptual similarities, do the two proposals indeed fall into one with merely different 
terminology, or is there a way to differentiate empirically between the two? One difference lies 
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in the specification of processes. The RIM clearly states that the impulsive system will always 
activate a behavioral schema, and the reflective system will provide a behavioral decision if the 
available resources allow for more effortful reflective processes. The GAM makes very similar 
predictions with the exception that the more elaborate processing (secondary appraisal) is not 
only contingent on the available resources but also on the outcome of an evaluation of the 
primary appraisal. If the primary appraisal is satisfactory, more elaborate processing will not 
take place. Although this difference might seem relatively modest, it points to a potential 
loophole in the GAM, as it is not specified which instance evaluates whether the outcome of the 
primary appraisal is satisfactory and on which bases. This is an important obstacle to empirical 
observation as one cannot disentangle the results of the primary appraisal from the second one. 
If aggression is shown this can always be explained by an appraisal on the first stage. Another 
difference between the two models concerns the order of processing. In the GAM, the primary 
(automatic) appraisal is finished before the secondary (controlled) appraisal begins, whereas the 
RIM postulates that both processes work in parallel. Assuming that the different processes could 
be traced with neuro-cognitive processes, it is conceivable to directly compare these two 
propositions. 
One of the crucial open questions for future research concerns the different sources of 
explicit vs. implicit self-concepts of aggressiveness. The RIM may serve as a guideline here as it 
suggests that what we typically refer to as the explicit self-concept is the result of information 
processing in the reflective system, a system that is highly flexible and also malleable by the 
mere addition of a negation or other qualifying information. In contrast, the impulsive system is 
often conceptualized as based on more habitual associative connections, less susceptible to fast 
and dramatic changes. This would imply that implicit self-concepts of aggressiveness are more 
stable than their explicit counterparts and that they are also likely to be based on longer-lasting 
learning histories. One potential implication might be that (repeated) early experiences with own 
violent behavior leave a stained mark on implicit self-concepts of aggressiveness and therefore 
AGGRESSION AND THE REFLECTIVE-IMPULSIVE MODEL  18 
constitute a lasting vulnerability to act out aggressively in situation with low self-control or 
external constraints in later life. 
This dual-process framework could also inform therapeutic attempts in changing 
problem behavior. It is a puzzling reality of forensic contexts that some offenders persistently 
behave aggressively although the consequences of this behavior are blatantly negative (Van 
Gelder, 2013). From the perspective of self-verification theory (Swann, 2011) people strive to 
maintain their personal self-concepts. According to this notion, fostering prosocial change in 
individuals with a deeply ingrained aggressive identity is particularly difficult due to 
individuals’ self-verification attempts through ongoing aggressive behavior. In turn, such 
dysfunctional self-reaffirmation likely results in an interpersonal vicious circle of aggressive 
behavior in which the aggressor’s self-concept will be reinforced. Interventions aiming to reduce 
aggressiveness typically address knowledge, insight, values, and goals – cognitive structures that 
operate exclusively at the level of reflective processing and are regarded as crucial drivers of 
prosocial responsibility taking. Unfortunately, to the extent that the causes of aggression are 
located at the impulsive level, standard intervention methods will have limited success. The 
application of the RIM calls for new types of interventions that specifically target implicit 
knowledge structures located in the impulsive system (e.g., Wiers, Gladwin, Hofmann, 
Salemink, & Ridderinkhof, 2013). 
Moreover, this underscores the necessity to rethink common confrontational therapeutic 
strategies meant to increase responsibility taking for past transgressions and decreasing external 
attributions (Ware & Mann, 2012; Maruna & Mann, 2006). This approach could have 
paradoxical side effects as repeated confrontation with one’s past aggressiveness might actively 
foster an aggressive self-concept on the reflective and the impulsive levels of the RIM by 
continuously coupling the self with transgressive behavior (i.e., increasing maladaptive self-
verification; Swann, 2011). Therefore, in line with findings from research on desistance factors 
in high-level career-criminals (Maruna, 2002), therapists should better focus their clients on 
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experiencing prosocial self-aspects in the here and now. Moreover, therapists should tolerate 
(realistic) external attributions for past transgressions that open possibilities to take 
responsibility for future behavior change tied to specific risk situations (Ware & Mann, 2012). 
Replacing “condemnation scripts” with “redemption scripts” (Maruna, 2002) is therapeutically 
much more conducive to behavioral change than implementing responsibility taking for past 
transgressions, which are only cementing antisocial self-concepts. 
In conclusion, the id as a historical forerunner of the impulsive system is not inhabited 
by destructive forces alone, as Freud already knew. Allowing an individual difference 
perspective on the respective degrees that aggressive and non-aggressive dispositions have in 
determining information processing at an automatic level, the RIM provides a useful guideline 
for an in-depth exploration of sometimes converging, sometimes diverging pathways to 
aggressive vs. non-aggressive behaviors. The RIM provides a powerful theoretical framework 
for aggression research that not only integrates more specialized models such as the GAM, it 
also has promises for substantial scientific advance by relating the known phenomena of 
aggressive behavior to state-of-the-art social cognition theory (Bluemke & Teige-Mocigemba, 
2015). It is now up to empirical aggression research to live up to these promises.  
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Regression of the z-standardized coach judgment of aggressiveness on the implicit 
aggressiveness measure (IATBehavior), social desirability, and their interaction collapsed for 
ice-hockey players and volleyball players (unpublished data from Banse et al., 2015; Study 1). 
Figure 2. Regression of the z-standardized aggressive behavior index (volume tuning) on the 
implicit aggressiveness measure (IATTrait), social desirability, and their interaction terms for 
female students (unpublished data from Banse et al., 2015; Study 2). 
Figure 3. Regression of the z-standardized aggressive behavior index (volume tuning) on the 
explicit aggressiveness measure (Reactive Aggressiveness subscale from Hampel & Selg, 
1998), the implicit aggressiveness measure (IATBehavior), the effect-coded ego depletion 
condition, and all two-way interactions (Schmidt et al., 2015). 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3
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